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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal in-
juries sustained by him when he was walking sourtJh on 
State Street crossing Rainbow Drive in Mll["I'ay, Utah, 
from the sidewalk on the north side of Rainbow Drive t.o 
the sidewalk on the south side of Rainbow Drive and was 
struck by defendant's car which was making a left turn 
to the east from State Street onto Rainbow Drive. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict 
of no cause of action in favor of the defendant and against 
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the plaintiff, upon which a judgment of no cause of action 
was entered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an order rema.ming the case to the trial 
C<1lrt for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought action against the defendant to re· 
cover damages sustained in an auto-pedestrian accident 
that occurred where Ra.inborw Drive intersects State Street 
in Murray, Utah, on December 29, 1962, at approximately 
6:15 p. m. State Street art Rainbow Drive is a six lane 
highway and includes a left turn lane for south-bound traf· 
fie at Raiinbow Drive. Rainbow Drive terminates at State 
Street. There is a sidewalk on the east side of Starte Street, 
both north and south of Rainbow Drive, which sidewalk is 
12 feet 5 inches from the curb to the Montek Building, 
which building is situated on the south side of Rainbow 
Drive and the east side of State Street (R. 118). From 
the east curb on State Street to the first painted line for 
the east lane of north-bound traffic, and which includes 
a parking lane, is 20 feet 7 inches (R. 117). The inside 
lane is 11 feet 5 inches and the westerly most lane for 
north-bound traffic is 10 feet 11 inches to 1Jhe center island 
(R. 117). From the southerly most point of the left turn 
island to tJhe east edge of the sidewalk area entering Rain· 
bow Drive is 86 feet 6 inches (R. 117). RainboW Drive 
from curb to curb, excluding sidewalk, is 34 feet 8 incheS 
(R. 116, 117). There is a street light approximately 100 
feet south of Rainbow Drive on the east side of State 
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Street, a street light approximately 100 feet nortJh of Rain-
bow Drive on State Street and a street light directly across 
State Street from Rainbow Drive on the west side of State 
Street approximately 100 feet (R. 115), (Exhibit 7'P). 
The plaintiff approached Rainbow Drive walking south 
on the east side of State Street (R. 194). When he arrived 
at Rainbow Drive he stopped, looked east on Rainbow 
Drive, looked for traffic coming north on State Street and 
looked to his right to see if any vehicles were in the lefit 
turn lane for south-bound traffic. There was no traffic 
in the left turn lane (R. 195). There was traffic moving 
north on State Street (R. 195). Plaintiff proceeded to 
walk across Rainbow Drive from 1the sidewalk on the north 
to the sidewalk on the south (R. 196, 197). Plaintiff trav-
eled 24 feet 8 inches from the north curb of Rainlbow Drive, 
or 2/3 of the way across Rainbow Drive (R. 196), when 
he was struck by defendant's vehicle (R. 116). The im-
pact occurred 10 feet 11 tnches from rthe south curb of 
Rainbow Drive (R. 115). Plaintiff saw defendant's car 
lights on him just prior to the impaot. Plaintiff cried ouJt 
to stop and attempted to get out of the way but oouid not 
m. 196). Plaintiff was struck near the center of defend-
ant's car toward the right side, denting the hood of defend-
ant's car (R. 119) and knocking defendant a distance of 20 
feet 7 inches (R. 116, 197) directly in front of defendant's 
car (R. 113). 
The road surface was dry and tt was dark (R. 119) . 
Defendant did not see the plaintiff until the impact, at 
Which time he saw plaintiff go in the air (R. 120, 271, 276). 
Defendant could see the sidewalk area from the left turn 
lane, but he did not see the plaintiff crossing Rainbow Drive 
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(R. 279). Defendant turned left' in front of a north-bound 
ortcoming vehicle (R. 275, 280). 
Plaintiff suffered a large hematoma over his lumbar 
area, an egg-like lump on the back of his head, large abra. 
sion over his buttocks with discoloration (R. 135) black 
and blue spots over his legs and his sides (R. 141) result· 
ing in a subdural hydroma (R. 161) and ruptured discs 
in his neck that required fussion (R. 173). 
Trial of the case was conducted Thursday, December 
10, and Friday, December 11, 1965. Court was in recess 
over the weekend, December 12 and 13, 1965, and recon· 
vened Monday, December 14, 1965, for instructing the jury, 
argument, and submission to the jury. During the week· 
end recess, one juror, Carl B. Fuller, visited the scene of 
the accident, stopped in the left turn lane, turned left onto 
Rainbow Drive, and made tests concerning his speed (R. 
97). The tests made by Fuller and his visitation of the 
scene of the accident were discussed by Fuller in the jury 
roam (R. 96, 95, 94) and influenced Fuller's verdict. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERREJD IN FAILING TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL BASED ON JURY MISCON· 
DUCT. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON UNAVOIJDABLE ACCIDENT. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING 
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THE JURY TO DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY CON-
CERNING LOSSES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF IN 
HIS BUSINESS. 
POINT 4 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS A WHOLE 
WERE PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6. 
POINT 6 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL BASED ON JURY MISCON-
DUCT. 
There is no question but what tJhere was misconduct 
on the part of the jury by juror Fuller making an unau-
thnrized inspection of the premises and making tests con-
crening speed while he was at the premises and discussing 
the results of his inspection and tests in the jury room. 
The question here involved is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. 
The law generally is stated in Jones on Evidence, 5th 
Edition, Section 462, page 874, as follows: 
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"A proposition that a juror or individual jurors have 
no right to investigate or acquire information relat-
ing to the case outside of that which is presented to 
them in the COW'Se of the trial in accordance with 
regular trial procedure, is too elementary to require 
discussion. Similarly it is improper conduct on the 
part of the jury to view the locus in quo or to make 
an experiment which has a bearing on the issue of 
the case; they may not thus gain knowledge concern-
ing matters in dispute except under the supervision 
of the court. 
Misconduct of this character on the part of the jury 
furnishes grounds for a new trial * * *" 
In the Oregon case of Schneider vs. Moe, 50 P 2d 577 
one of the jurors without the consent of the court and 
without the knowledge of either the Plaintiff or the De-
fendant went to the scene of the accident to determine 
whether a witness standing at the place testified to could 
have seen the accident. The Oregon Court stated at page 
579: 
"We think that when the action of this juror had been 
disclosed to the trial court by the uncontradicted affi· 
davits filed in support of the motion for a new trial 
and no e~lanation or denial of this unwarranted con· 
duct upon the part of one of the jurors had been made. 
1:Jhe motion should have been granted, and its refusal 
by the trial court was an abuse of discretion." 
The Oregon Court goes on to quote from other juris· 
dictions, and particularly quotes Woodbury vs. City of 
Anoka, 52 Minn. 329, 54 N. W. 187, where two jurors had 
visited the scene of the accident. The court said: 
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"There can be no question that what was done by the 
two jurors may have had an influence on their minds 
unfavorable to the plaintiff. It is manifest, from their 
making the examination, that they thought that by 
making it they could learn something proper for them 
to consider in coming to a verdict. Perhaps they 
thought they could determine from it whether 1Jhe 
witnesses for Pl,aintiff, testifying that at the time of 
and before the injury the sidewalk was in general 
bad condition, or the witnesses for Defendant, testi-
fying to the contrary, were to be believed. It is im-
possible to say it did not influence their minds against 
the Plaintiff, and because of their misconduct there 
must be a new trial." 
The Oregon Court further quotes the New York Court, 
page 580, the case of In re Vanderbilt, 127 .Aipp. Div. ~. 
111 N.Y.S. 558 as follows: 
"We cannot determine with certainty, nor is it neces-
sary that we should, that the acts complained of did 
in!'luence the verdict. It is sufficient cause for re-
versal if they are likely to do so." 
And further, page 580, the court quot.es Luquer vs. 
Bunnel, (Sup.) 170 N.Y.S. 665, 666, as follows: 
"The inspection by certain of the jurors of the place 
of the accident was without the knowledge of the at-
torneys herein, and was no doubt made wthout the 
slightest intention of wrongdoing; but it remains 1Jhat 
those of the jury who made 1Jhe visit had ocular evi-
dence which was denied to their associates. It is im-
portant that every possible safeguard should be thrown 
around 'tlhe conduct of a trial, to the end that no ques-
tion can arise as to the fairness thereof." 
'I1he Oregon Court goes on to quote from Rhode Is-
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land, P. 580, Garcide vs. Land Watch Case Co., 17 RI 691 
24 A. 470, 472: ' 
"'Dhe conduct of the jurors in thus obtaining evidence 
for themselves which, it may fiairly be inferred, affec. 
ted to a greater or less degree their ve'l'dict in the case. 
is wholly inexCUS1able and highly reprehensible. They 
were sworn to give a true verdict in the case, accord-
ing to the law ~nd the evidence given them. Thls 
means, as everybody knows, that the case is to be 
tried and decided solely upon the law and the evidence 
as given in the court, or under its immediate direction; 
and 'to permit them to take into consideration evidence 
not produced upon the trial, and without the knowl· 
ooge or consent of either party, is subversive of all 
rules which govern the admissibility of testimony, and 
of the right of a fair and impartial trial by jury.' 
Stewart vs. Burlington & Missouri River R. R. Co .. 
11 Iowa 62, 64." 
The Oregon Court further quotes from Ohio, Losey 
vs. Creamer, 45 Ohio App. 356, 187 N.E. 197, 198: 
"'Dhe situation invokes the rule that where the miscon· 
duct may have been prejudicial, and it cannort be as-
certained that prejudice did nort result, prejudice will 
be presumed. This rule is a salutary one. Verdicts 
ought not be tainted by wrongdoing where injury may 
have resulted." 
Further, the Oregon Court quotes from Minnesota· 
page 581, the case of Twaddle vs. Mendenhall, 80 Minn. 177, 
83 N.W. 135, 136: 
"It is settled that misconduct of this nature (vieWing 
premises) can be shown by the affidavits of the jurors 
themselves, an exception to 1:!he general rule in respect 
to jurors' affidavits. It is also settled in this court 
that where the gist of the action, as was the case here, 
is the character or condition of the locus in quo, or 
where a view of it will enable the jurors 1Jhe better to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses, or any other 
disputed facts in the case, if in such a case the jurors, 
without the permission of the court or knowledge of 
the parties, visit the locality for the e:q>ress purpose 
of acquiring such information, their verdict will be 
set aside, unless it is clear that their misconduct could 
not and did not influence their verdict." 
In the case of Middleton vs. Kansas City Public Ser-
vice Company, (Missouri) 152 S.W. 2nd 154, a jury ver-
dict for $10,000 was returned in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant. There was a showing of misoon-
duct on the part of a juror in thart he actively S01Ugbt out 
a 1931 Chevrolet automobile to measure the fender. There 
was no finding by the court that the misconduct Sh()IW11 did 
not influence the veroict, nor that the !Defendant was not 
prejudiced thereby. The Missouri Court, in reversing the 
lower court and ordering a new trial, stat;ed as follows, 
Page 159: 
"We think the record in the present case affirmatively 
shows the trial court did not exercise a sorund judi-
cial discretion in ruling the motion. In overruling 
the motion for a new trial, the trial coort did nort ex-
pressly or by implication determine prejudice or no 
prejudice to Defendant on account of the proven mis-
conduct of the juror, because the records show the 
court ruled the motion upon the theory that the bur-
den remained upon Defendant to show that the estab-
lished misconduct of the juror influenced the verdict, 
even though the misconduct was established and it was 
such misconduct that prejudice would be presumed. 
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~though ~endant made a prima facie case of preju. 
dice, the tnal court did not rule tJhat no prejudice re. 
sulted, but instead based its ruling on the theory that 
there must also he a showing the misconduct influ-
enced ~he verdict. The court should have e:x:pre&<;Jy 
determmed the question of prejudice to Defendant or 
should have ruled the question as to whether or not 
the misconduct shown influenced the verdict. Since 
it did not do so, either expressly or by necessary im-
plication, but placed its decision on other grounds, it 
cannot be said that the order overruling the motion 
represents the exercise of such a sound judicial dis-
cretion that it should not be disturbed on appeal." 
The court goes on to state, page 160: 
"In this case a verdict for $10,000 signed by juror Tudor 
as foreman, was returned against the Defendant. The 
only evidence in tJhe record to overcome the prima 
facie case of influence and prejudice was the affidavits 
of the jurors themselves, which affidavits, as we have 
seen, have little probative value. In addition nine of 
the affidavits are written in the same form. Defend· 
ant was entitled to have its case tried by twelve im· 
partial jurors (Lee vs. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo 
458, 136 S.W. 2nd 695, 69 8,127 A.L.R. 711); and to 
have a fair trial upon the evidence produced in court. 
In this case, the acts and conduct of juror Tudor deft· 
nitely cast a shadow over the vedict. We cannot say, 
nor do we believe he could properly say, that his own 
interest, investigation, and measurements, admitted!Y 
made, did not influence his verdict. The affidavits of 
the other jurors do not say they did not learn of sud! 
measurements as made by juror Tudor, but state 'tha1 
if any mention was made • • • of measuremen~ 
"' "' • not mentioned in evidence such measurements 
if any were mentioned, were not taken into consider· 
ation'. 
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We are unable to say from the whole record that the 
active interest and evident attitude of juror Tudor, and 
his independent search for and acquisition of facts 
outside the record did not influence the verdict or that 
Defendant was not prejudiced by the misconduct of 
this juror." 
In another Oregon case, Wolfe vs. Union Pacfic Rail-
road Company, 366 P. 2nd 622, the jury returned a ver-
dict for Plaintiff. Defendant moved for a new trial on 1Jhe 
grounds one of the jurors had visited the scene of itlhe ac-
cident. The court granted the motion, stating as follows, 
Page 624: 
"It is the rule in this state that an unauthorized inspec-
tion of the locus in quo by a juror is ground for 
setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial unless 
it is clear that the misconduct could not have influ-
enced the verdict." 
In a Colorado case of Butters vs. Dewan, 363 P. 2nd 
494, Plaintiff sought damages for the wrongful death of 
her husband and personal injuries to herself. The case was 
tried to a jury that returned a verdict of no cause of action. 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial based upon jury miscon-
duct was denied. The Colorado Appellate Court reversed 
the trial court and ordered a new trial. During the course 
of the trial and without the knowledge of either party or 
their counsel, one of the jurors made inquiry of the former 
employer of the deceased concerning the deceased's drink-
ing habits. There was no evidence that the inquiry made 
influenced rtJhe jurors' verdict. The court stated, page 496: 
"It is not the province of the court to speculate, con-
jecture or determine what or how much effect upon a 
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~erdict the ~oss misc?11duct of a juror or jurors may 
m fact have m a particular case. While a correct d terminatoi~ might.be possible in some cases, the inq~ 
~ould be impractical and useless in many cases and 
m all cases contain an element of speculation. 
"The proper function of the court is to hear the facts 
of the alleged misconduct and to determine as a mat. 
ter of law the effect reasona:bly calculated to be pro-
duced upon the minds of the jury by such miscon-
duct. McClean vs. People, 66 Colo. 486, 180 P. 676. 
"':Dhe law is well stated in Panko vs. Flintkote Co., 7 
N.J. 55, 80 A. 2nd 602, 305, from which case we 
quote with approval: 
'it is well settled that the test for determining whether 
a new tri,al will be granted because of the misconduct 
of jurors or the intIUSion of irregular influences is 
whether such matters could have a tendency to influ-
ence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner 
inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's 
charge. If the irregular matter has that tendency on 
the face of it, a neW trial should be granted without 
further inquiry as to its actual effect. The test is not 
whether the irregular matter acually influenced the 
result, but whether it had the capacity of doing Sll1• 
The stringe111cy of this rule is grounded upon the neces-
sity of keeping the administration of justice pure and 
free from all suspicion of corrupting practices. It is 
said to be imparatively required to secure verdicts 
based on proofs taken openly at the trial, free from 
all danger by extraneous influences' * * *" (Empha· 
sis supplied) 
Page 497: 
"'As was stated in Scott vs. Tubbs, 43 Colo. 221, 95 P. 
540, 541, 19 L.R.A., N.S., 733: '* * * * nor should 
13 
the court consider whether the verdict was or was 
not influenced by the petitioner. The conduct com-
plained of is so manifestly improper that there is but 
one course open * *' * . *' 
"Trial courts are ever vigilant in seeking to prevent ex-
traneous matters from being presented and possibly 
infiuencing the minds of jurors. Jury verdicts must 
be based upon evidentiary facts properly before the 
jury for its consideration and determination. To con-
done this juror's misconduct and to assume that his 
mind was uninfluenced by the extra-judicial investi-
gation of incompetent, inadmissible matters, finds no 
sanction in the law. Such conduct deprives plaintiff 
of the fair and impartial trial to which every litigant 
under our law is entitled." 
Plaintiff adopts the sound reasoning of the courts 
herein quoted. Plaintiff strongly feels that he was de-
prived of a fair and impartial trial due to the misconduct 
of the juror. The juror himself in his affidavit states 
that his inspection and test could have influenced his ver-
dict. The test was made under conditions dissimilar 1Jo 
that existing in the case. 'I1he juror stated in making the 
test that he came to a stop, then made the turn, whereas 
the testimony in the case was that the Defendant merely 
slowed down, rather than stopped. There is no evidence 
as to the type of vehicle used by the juror in m.aldng the 
test, and as to whether it was daylight or dark; or how 
the accelleration was attempted by the said juror; the con-
dition of traffic, if any, as well as other matters all mak-
ing the inspection and test unreliable and prejudicial as 
far as the Plaintiff is concerned. 
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POINT 2 
TiiE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING 
TIIE JURY ON UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
There is no dispute but what this was a case of an 
automobile making a left hand turn and colliding with a 
pedestrian. There is no evidence in the case of a sudden 
illness, such as insulin shock, sudden and unpredicted me-
chanical failure or any evidence that the accident happened 
from an unknown or unforeseen cause or in an unexplain-
able manner. Defendant testified that Plaintiff loomed in 
head of him on the hood of his car; however, we can find 
no cases wherein courts have given credence to the appa-
rition theory. 
Though this Court has subscribed to the theory that 
an unavoidable accident instruction in the case of sudden 
and unanticipated or unpredicted insulin shock is a proper 
case for an instruction on unavoidable accident, Porter vs. 
Price, 11 Utah 2nd 80; nevertheless, it is clear by an abun-
dance of cases that the instruction should not be given in 
an ordinary accident case that could be avoided by the 
exercise of proper care. It is expressly urged upon this 
Court that the instruction given in this particular case was 
completely improper, prejudicial and a basis for a new 
trial. 
It is further urged to this Court that it should recon-
sider its prior rulings concerning an instruction covering 
unavoidable accident and that this Court should subscribe 
to the now extant California rule that an instruction as to 
unavoidable accident accomplishes nothing and lends un-
due emphasis to the defense. This Court in the case of 
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Porter vs. Price (Supra) considered the California case 
of Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal 2nd 652, 320 P. 
2d. 500, 65 ALR 2nd 1. 
Plaintiff is of the opinion that Chief Justice Gibson 
in the Butigan case properly states the law and its pro-
gress wherein Chief Justice Gibson states: 
"In the modern negligence action the plaintiff must 
prnve that the injury complained of was proximately 
caused by the defendant's negligence, and the defend-
ant under a general denial may Slhow any circum-
stance which militates against his negligence or its 
causal effect. The so called defense of inevitable ac-
cident is nothing more than a denial by the defend-
ant of negligence, or a contention that his negligence, 
if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury 
;if * ·:~ *'' 
"'1'he statement in the quoted instruction on 'unavoid-
able or inevitable accident' that these terms 'simply 
denote an accident that occurred without having been 
proximately caused by negligence' informs the jury 
that the question of unavoidability or inevitability of 
an accident arises only where the plaintiff fails to sus-
tain his burden of proving that the defendant's negli-
gence caused the accident. Since the ordinary in-
structions on negligence and proximate cause suffi-
ciently show that the plaintiff must sustain his bur-
den of proof on t:hese issues in order to recover, the 
instruction on unavoidable accident serves no useful 
purpose. 
"It is particularly significant that no decision in this 
state, either prior or subsequent to Parker vs. Wo-
mack, 37 Cal 2nd 116, 230 P2d 823, has held that re-
fusal to give t!he instruction was reversible error. In 
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several cases in which error had been claimed becaUSe 
of such a refusal, it was held that the instruction was 
superfluous." 
" ~, >r.· *' The instruction is not only unnecessary but 
it is also confusing. When the jurors are told' that 
'in law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable 
or inevitable accident' they may get the impression 
that unavoidability is an issue to be decided and that 
if proved, it constitutes a separate ground af nonlia'. 
bility of the defendant. Thus, they may be misled as 
to the proper manner of determining liability, that is, 
solely on the basis of negligence and proximate caus-
ation. The rules concerning negligence and proxi-
mate causation which must be explained to the jury 
are in themselves complicated and difficult to under-
stand. The further complication resulting from the 
unnecessary corncept of unavoidability or inevitability 
and its problematic relation to negligence and proxi-
mate cause can lead only to misunderstanding. * * * *" 
"The giving of the confusing or misleading instruction 
is, of course, error, and we are of the view that, in 
the absence of a special situation * * * the use of 
unavoidable accident instructions should be disap-
proved * * * " 
"q,' ~' * Ln addition, the giving of the instruction ob-
viously over-emphasized defendant's case, and, as we 
have said, the instruction sugested to the jury that 
they should consider unavoidability as an issue or 
ground of defense separate and apart from the ques-
tions of negligence and proximate causation." 
We believe the law in Utah closely parallels the law 
in the State of California in that we have been unable to 
find any cases in the State of Utah wherein it has been held 
error to fail to give an instruction om unavoidable accident. 
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In the recent case of Wellman vs. Noble, 12 Utah 2nd 
350, 366 P.2d 701, a vehicle driven by the defendant had 
followed a combination of vehicles some 5 miles, came over 
the crest of a hill and rammed the Cadillac in which the 
plaintiff was situated, causing plaintiff to suffer a whip-
lash injury. The driver stated he did not see the parked 
car until approximately 100 feet away and was unable to 
stop to a void the collision. One of the basis for appeal was 
the court's failure to instruct on unavoidable accident. This 
court sta t~d. P. 352: 
"Her2 the issue 0£ unavoidable accident is not involved 
anymore than in practically any ort:heT accident case." 
It is stated in 65 ALR 2nd, page 85, that in 1Jhe ma-
jo1ity of the cases involving the striking of pedestrians at 
or n€ar stree1 intersections, instructions on unavoidable 
accident and inevitable accident instructions have been 
considered inappropriate. A few of the cases are cited as 
follows: 
"McBride vs. Woods (1950) 124 Colo. 384, 238 P.2d 
183-Where the mishap resulted when the [)efendant, whose 
car was parked diagonally, in a place marked near a street 
intersection, :backed the car out in daylight, slowly, but 
striking Plaintiff, an elderly person who was passing on the 
crosswalk and moving somewlhat in the direction the ve-
hicle was backed. The Defendant did not see the Plain-
tiff, nor was he immediately aware that he had struck 
her, and he testified that, "It was not possible to baick out 
of that parking space antd miss the car ahead and get into 
my own lane without backing into the crosswalk." He 
conceded that the bumper of his car was backed into 1Jhe 
crosswalk a distance of about 3 feet. 'l"he court following 
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a verdict for the Defendant held it was error to submit to 
the jury the question of unavoidable accident, "where there 
is absolutely no evidence in the case which warrants a sub-
mission" of such question, "all evidence clearly showing 
tJhat the accident could have been avoided." 
P. 86. In Quillin vs. Colquhoun, (1926) 42 Idaho 522 
' 
247 P. 740--wherein a pedestrian suffered injuries at or 
near a street intersection, the court in reversing the judg-
ment for Defendant disapproved of the inclusion of the 
words "an accident" in the instruction that if the jury found 
from a preponderance of evidence that the misadventure 
''was an accident and not attributable to the negligence of 
anyone" the verdict should be for the Defendant. 
P. 86. In the Missouri case of Jones vs. Goldberg, 78 
S. W. 2nd 509 - A pedestrian was injured at a street 
intersection. It was held that the evidence merely presen· 
ted issues of negligence and contributory negligence, that 
there was no basis for the giving of a so called accident in-
struction to the effect that if Plaintiff's injuries were caused 
by an accident, mischance or misfortune, and nort by any 
negligence om the part of the defendant contributing there-
to, plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Consequently, it 
was held that the giving of the instruction was error and 
warranted the trial court in granting a new trial aft.er a 
verdict for the defendant. 
P. 89. In the case of Orr vs. Hart, (1934) 219 Iowa 
408, 258 N.W. 84-a street pedestrian case, it was held 
error to give an unavoidable accident instruction inasmuch 
as "the record shows conclusively that this accident hap-
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pened through the fault and negligence of one or both of 
the parties thereto." 
P. 89. In the case of Smith vs. Johnson (1954) 2 Ill. 
App. 2nd 315, 120 N.E. 2nd 58-a case of injury to a street 
pedestrian, it was held en·or to give an accident instruc--
tion inasmuch as there was no evidence that the pedestri-
an's injuries were sustained by accident alone not coupled 
with negligence. 
P. 89. In Levans vs. Vigne, (1936) 339 Mo. 550, 98 
S.W. 2nd 737-a street pedestrian case, it was held not 
error to refuse to give an accident instruction since the 
case presented an issue of negligence of defendant and not 
of casualty from an unknown cause. 
It is stated in 1 Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automobile 
Law & Practice, Section 635, Chapter 15, P. 485: 
"A m2re aocident being one in which neither 
party is at fault, the mere fact that neither driver of 
two automobiles colliding witll each other saw the 
other until too late to avoid the collision is not enough 
to show that the accident was unavoidable, since in 
such a case the negligence, if any, producing the sit-
uation. determines the liability, so that if either party 
can avoid an accident by the exercise of proper care 
it oannot be said to be unavoidable. For example, if 
a blowout occurs but the driver of the car is reckl~. 
the blowout is no defense." 
"In other words the issue of unavoidable accident arises 
only under evidence showing the accident happened 
from an unknown or unforeseen cause or in an unex-
plainable manner, which circumstances rebut defend-
ant's alleged negligence * • • " 
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The facts in the present case clearly indicate the de-
fendant did not see the plaintiff prior to striking him. The 
only explanation for the defendant not seeing the plaintiff 
p1ior to striking him is that the defendant either was not 
looking, or if he looked, did not see what was there to be 
seen. The giving of such an instruction under the circum-
stances of this case was prejudicial to the plaintiff, was 
certainly not encompassed within the facts of the case, and 
was error on the part of the trial court. Plaintiff further 
urges this Court to subscribe to the California rule that 
instructions on unavoidable accidents should be disapproved 
and in any event, should not have been given in this par-
ticular case. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY TO DISREGARD THE TESTIMONY CON-
CERNING LOSSES SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF IN 
HIS BUSINESS. 
The trial court by its instruction No. 10 instructed the 
jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that the court has struck from the 
case all the evidence that has been presented to you 
relating to the alleged loss claimed to have been sus-
tained by the Plaintiff, Vernon J. Smith, from the op-
eration of his business, Town & Country Rambler, 
"Therefore, you are not permitted to consider that evi-
dence in arriving at the amount of your award of dam-
ages for Mr. Smith, if you decide that he is entitled to 
recover damages." 
Instructioo No. 10 was prejudicial error as far as 
Plaintiff is concerned. Plaintiff presented testimony con-
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cerning his business loss, his change in his cash position by 
reason of the Plaintiff being absent from his business, in 
which it forced the Plaintiff to incur an $11,000 obligation 
that he would not otherwise had to incur in order to keep 
his business operative (R. 204, 205). '11his was testimony 
in the nature of the increased cost of doing business which 
was incurred as a result of the loss of Plaintiff's services 
to the business and which is direct testimony concerning 
the impairment of Plaintiff's earning power. Such impair-
ment and costs are all proper matters to be su!bmitted to 
the jury for its consideration in determining what effect 
the owner's injuries have upon his earning power. 
The case of Kennerd vs. Kaelin-Wash. (1961) 364 P. 
2nd 446-----khe trial court admitted evidence concerning the 
Plaintiff's pallet board manufacturing business and the ef-
fect which his disabilities had upon his earning capacity in 
that business. The court admitted evidence that the plain-
tiff's services to his business were curtailed, th'at the cost 
of labor was increased after his accident. The Washington 
court instructed the jury that in considering the monetary 
loss suffered by the Plaintiff, if any, as a result of the im-
pairment of his earning capacity, it should take as a stan-
dard measurement the value of Plaintiff's services to his 
O\vn business and that in computing such value it should 
take into consideration the following factors: 1. The in-
creased costs of doing business which the evidence showed 
were related to the Plaintiff's injuries. 2. The cost of 
additional help in conducting the Plaintiff's business neces-
sitated by his injuries as established by the evidence. 3. 
The market value or amount commonly paid for the ser-
vices which respondent had been and would be prevented 
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from rendering to his business as estabHshed by the evi-
dence. The jury was further instructed that the 3 factors 
were not offered as distinct elements of damage, ibut as a 
guide to measure the impairment of the respondent's earn. 
ing capacity. 
The Washington court stated, page 447: 
"The evidence did not disclose a change in profits, and 
the jury was not instructed to consider loss of profits 
as an element of damage. The evidence and the in-
structions merely dealt with the impairment of the 
respondent's earning capacity. Since one of his sour-
ces of income was the business that he owned, and to 
wthich he had cootributed his personal services, the 
value of those services was a proper factor to consider 
in determining the extent of the impairment of his 
earning capacity." 
" ':' * ':' the character and extent of the business, as 
well as the income therefrom, are all proper matters 
to submit to the jury for its consideration in deter· 
mining what effect the owner's injuries have had upon 
his earning power. We find no error in admitting the 
evidence or in the court's instructions regarding the 
significance which the jury shoruld attach to it." 
Giving of instruction No. 10 not only was error but 
also striking evidence by way orf an instruction, lends un· 
due emphasis to the defense, and since no reason was givt'fl 
for the evidence being stricken, leads the jury to the con· 
clusion that the judge must not have believed the plaintiff 
and therefore the jury should not believe the plaintiff. 
This plaintiff ascribes as being prejudicial error. 
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POINT 4 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY AS A WHOLE 
WERE PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is clear from the reading of the court's instmctions 
that undue emphasis was given to the defense, thereby 
making the plaintiff's task of proving his case by a pre-
ponderance of evidence an awesome burden. The Court 
will note that the trial court's instruction No. 6 was a gen-
eral instruction concerning negligence, ordinary care and 
approximate cause. Number 7 then went on to instruct 
eoncerning contributory negligence. Number 8 conremed 
a preponderance of evidence. Number 9 a burden of proof, 
and then instruction No. 10 (discussed as point 3 herein) 
was inserted which immediately cut ground from under 
the Plaintiff. Number 10 was followed by instruction No. 
11, (discussed under point 2 herein) as to an un-
avoidable accident, again lending great emphasis to the 
defense. Instruction No. 12 is an instruction to the effect 
That a person who uses due care has a right to assume that 
another also will use due care. Number 13 states that the 
Defendant was not under a duty to foresee all 1Jhat he might 
by way of hindsight and that he was not required to use 
extraordinary caution to avoid an injury that he could not 
reasonably have expected. Instruction 14 sets forth that 
the Plaintiff to be free of contributory negligence must 
keep a reasonable and adequate lookout, to use ordinary 
care and not to place himself in a position of danger and 
that if Plaintiff was walking in other than a crosswalk or 
an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, that he must 
yield the right of way to all vehicles on the roadway. It 
is not until the trial court reaches its instruction 15 and 
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1~ that it discusses the defendant's duties which would con-
stitute negligence toward the plaintiff. 
. . ~onsidering the instructions as a whole, they are pre-
JUd1crnl and patently unfair to the plaintiff herein. 
POINT 5 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6. 
Plaintiff's requested instruction number 6 reads as 
follows: 
"You are instructed that the Defendant, Wilmer Lee 
Barnett, is negligent as a matter of law in failing to 
observe the Plaintiff, Vernon J. Smith, prior to strik· 
ing Mr. Smith with his vehicle." 
It is clear and undisputed from the evidence that the de-
fendant, Wilmer Lee Barnett, did not see Mr. Smith, the 
plaintiff herein, until he had struck Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Smith was on the hood of his vehicle (R. 279, 280, 282). 
The Defendant did not know where Mr. Smith came from 
or which direction he was going or where he was just prior 
to the impact, except that Defendant testified he went only 
a foot or two with his vehicle after the impact. If the 
Defendant was driving at 5 to 10 miles an hour, which was 
his testimony, and if his lights were on, and on an intersec· 
tion such as this, there is no reason why the Defendant 
should not have seen the Plaintiff prior to the impact and 
prior to striking the Plaintiff with the center orf defend· 
ant's vehicle. The only believable evidence has to be that 
the Defendant was not looking or he did not see what was 
there to be seen or that he was going faster than his testi· 
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mony concerning his speed. The law is so clear as to not 
require any citations to the effect that if a person fails to 
keep a proper lookout, he is negligent as a matter of law. 
POINT 6 
TI-IE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1. 
Plaintiff's requested instruction number 1 reads as 
follows: 
"You are instructed as a matter of law that defendant 
was negligent in the operation of his automobile. You 
are further instructed that the plaintiff, Vernon J. 
Smith, is entitled to damages and that you must award 
damages in accordance with the following instructions 
concerning damages:" 
The Plaintiff testified he was walking south on State 
Street as he approached Rainbow !Drive. Plaintiff looked 
for traffic prior to crossing. Plaintiff looked to his left 
for traffic approaching on Rainbow Drive. Plaintiff looked 
south for North bound traffic that may turn East on Rain-
bow Drive and plaintiff looked to his right for left turn-
ing traffic going South on State Street. There was no 
traffic in the left tum lane when plaintiff began to cross 
Rainbow Drive (R. 195). Plairiiff then testified as he 
crossed Rainbow Drive he kept a lookout for other traffic 
and since there was North bound traffic his attention was 
directed to the North bound traffic which ofttimes turned 
left on Rainbow Drive (R. 227). Plaintiff had walked 24 feet 
8 inches across Rainbow Drive when he was struck by De-
fendant' s vehicle. Plaintiff saw defendant's vehicle prior 
to its striking him. Plaintiff shouted and attempted to get 
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out of the way of defendant's vehicle but he was run down 
and struck by the defendant without the defendant ever 
seeing the plaintiff (R. 196). Plaintiff testified he was in 
the area which would be an extension of the sidewalk run-
ning from the North side of Rainbow Drive to the South 
side. Defendant testified as he approached the left turn 
lane on State Street he slowed but did not stop and that 
one North bound vehicle passed and defendant then crossed 
in front of another North bound vehicle (R. 275). Plain· 
tiff drove a distance of 86 feet 6 inches from the South 
edge of the left turn area to the East edge of the sidewalk 
on State Street. The impact of the vehicle on Mr. Smith 
dented the front end of the vehicle and caused injurle:; on 
Mr. Smith wthich included a large hematoma over his lum· 
bar area, an egg-like lump on the back of his head, large 
abrasion over his buttock with discoloration, black and 
blue spots over his legs and his sides which injuries resul· 
ted in a subdural hydroma and ruptured discs in his neck 
that required fussion. Defendant testified that he was go-
ing 5 to 10 m.p.h. (R. 282) and that he stopped within one 
or two feet after striking Mr. Smith. Officer Kutulas tes-
tified (R. 188) that a vehicle going 10 m.p.h. excluding any 
reaction time at all and after the foot is firmly on the brake 
would travel 10 feet before coming to a stop. 
From the physical facts and from the testimony the 
only believable evidence which is substantiated by the phy· 
sical evidence is that the plaintiff was struck in the CfOS.Y 
walk area and knocked a distance of 20 feet 7 inches by 
the defendant and that the defendant's speed was such that 
the plaintiff was unable to get out of the way of the de-
fendant' s vehicle as it bore down upon him and that the 
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defendant did not see the plaintiff until the plaintiff was 
on the hood of the defendant's car. 
The trial court erred in failing to grant plaintiff's re-
quested instruction No. 1, and the case should have been 
tried only on the matter of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the jury misconduct and the error in law 
committed by the trial court, the case should be remanded 
to the lower court for a new trial with directions to the 
ltJwer court concerning proper jury instructions. 
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